A New Emerging Middle East (dis)- Order in a Post-Sikes-Picot Era

    A New Emerging Middle East (dis) Order in a Post-Sikes-Picot Era

I have coined a new term that might best capture what we experience nowadays in the Middle East with the US-Israel war ongoing against Iran. The “Post-Sikes-Picot Era” is gradually emerging as we are witnessing the collapse of the older order of the Middle East. What is interesting is that this new middle east order looks more like disorder. This disorder marks the end of a century-old order known as Sikes-Picot Agreement that divided the region into countries that never saw peace, coexistence nor order or political stability. This was because it was imposed from the outside by colonial powers of the Great Britain and France after the First World War and the collapse of the Old, Sick man of Europe, that is the Former Ottoman Empire.

Have we entered a Post-Sikes-Picot Era in the Middle East?

For over a century, the modern Middle East has been shaped by a single, controversial framework: the Sykes–Picot Agreement. Designed in secrecy during World War I, it carved the region into states that still exist today. But in recent decades—through wars, uprisings, and shifting power dynamics—many analysts are asking a critical question:

Sykes–Picot Agreement

The Sykes–Picot Agreement was a secret 1916 understanding between Great Britain and France, with assent from the Russian Empire, to divide the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces into zones of influence after World War I. Named for negotiators Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, it became a defining moment in the making of the modern Middle East.

Provisions and consequences of the  agreement allocated direct French control over coastal Syria and Lebanon, British control over southern Mesopotamia, and spheres of indirect influence inland. Palestine was designated for international administration. When the Bolsheviks published the treaty in the Manchester Guardian in 1917, it exposed colonial duplicity toward Arab allies promised independence in the concurrent Hussein–McMahon Correspondence.

 According to the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foriegn Affairs, a century after the Sykes-Picot Agreement signed in 1916 between France and Britain, the Middle-East remains a political powder keg and the location of successive armed conflicts. The boundaries drawn just a century ago by Western powers are evaporating. Suddenly, the whole character of the region is changing beyond all recognition.

 The Legacy of Sykes–Picot

The borders of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan were not formed organically. They were imposed by colonial powers with little regard for ethnic, tribal, or sectarian realities. For decades, strong centralized governments held these states together. But the underlying tensions never disappeared—they were merely contained. Today, those tensions are resurfacing in ways that challenge the very foundations of the region.

What Sykes–Picot actually created

The agreement between Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot divided the Ottoman Middle East into spheres of influence, leading to modern states like: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. These borders were externally imposed, not based on ethnic or sectarian realities.

Cracks in the Old System and the rise of fragmented states

Several Middle Eastern countries no longer function as unified states in the traditional sense: Syria remains divided into multiple zones of control. Iraq operates with significant internal autonomy, especially in the Kurdistan Region. And Lebanon struggles with political paralysis and competing power centers.

These are not border changes on paper—but they are real changes on the ground. Then why do people say it’s “collapsing”? Over the last two decades—especially after the 2003 Iraq War and the Arab Spring—several trends have weakened the old order. Weak States, strong Non-State actors for example groups like ISIS literally declared the end of Sykes–Picot borders in 2014. Also militias and paramilitary forces now rival governments in places like Iraq and Syria.

Also, se facto fragmentation if you see that Syria is divided into multiple zones of control. Iraq functions partly as a decentralized system, especially with the Kurdistan Region. And Lebanon is heavily influenced by non-state actors. Worthy to mention is the rise of regional powers. Countries like: Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and most recently Israel are shaping the region more than Western colonial powers once did.

Post Sykes-Picot Disorder

Many geopolitical analysts, including myself believe that there is not a "new order" yet, not really and not a stable one, rather, what we are seeing is not a clean replacement of the former order. There’s no new agreement like Sykes–Picot. No clear borders are being redrawn officially. However, on the social media many people in the Middle East are increasingly talking about Donald-Natanyahoo Agreement for the Middle East and or there are talks about The New Middle East plan to redraw the maps. However, with the Operation Epic Fury in its third week and no clear horizen when this war ends, it is too early to talk about such geopolitical agreements. 

 What is obvious is that there is a messy transition. Instead of an order, we have informal zones of influence, Proxy conflicts, Economic corridors replacing political unity and Identity-based politics (ethnic, sectarian, ideological) in the region. One can think of it as a “post-Sykes–Picot disorder” rather than a new order.

The power of Non-State actors

Groups like militias and armed movements now rival, and sometimes surpass, state authority. In some areas, governments no longer hold a monopoly on force. This represents a fundamental shift away from the nation-state model that Sykes–Picot helped create. Then we have regional powers reshaping the Map. The Middle East is no longer dominated by Western powers. Instead, regional actors are defining the new balance: Iran expanding its influence through allied networks, however, Iran's regional hegemony is not heavily tested under fire and all of its powerful allied militias in the region and weakened and nearly all of Iran's weapons systems are degraded and destroyed. Turkey is projecting power beyond its borders. Gulf states are shaping political and economic alliances, however, during this war the Gulf States are facing existential crisis due to the risks of Iranian missiles and drones that have undermined their security. So far, it seems that the only victor so far is the state of Israel who are setting the new terms and conditions in redefining regional normalization and shaping security dynamics. The result is a multi-polar Middle East, not a colonial one.

 Identity Over Borders

Ethnic and sectarian identities are becoming more politically relevant than national identity in many areas. The Kurdish question, in particular, is central to any future regional order. Spread across multiple countries, the Kurds represent one of the largest stateless nations in the world—and their political trajectory could reshape borders or governance models.

A Collapse—or a Transformation?

It would be inaccurate to say Sykes–Picot has fully collapsed. Because International borders still exist, States are still recognized globally and no formal agreement has replaced the old system. However, what has collapsed is the effectiveness of those borders. Control is now fragmented. Sovereignty is contested. Authority is layered. This is not a clean transition—rather, it is a messy transformation.

What could a New Middle East Order look like?

While no single vision dominates, several trends suggest what may emerge:

First: a de facto federalism: countries may remain intact officially but operate as decentralized or semi-autonomous regions. Second: Spheres of Influence. Instead of fixed borders, power may be defined by influence zones controlled by regional actors. Third:  Strategic Geography Over Political Borders. Energy routes, trade corridors, and infrastructure projects could matter more than traditional maps. Fourth: The Rise of Sub-State actors where regions, cities, and local authorities may gain more power than national governments.

Why this matters for Kurdistan?

For the Kurdistan Region and Kurds across the Middle East, this transformation is not abstract—it is deeply consequential. Greater autonomy may become normalized. New alliances could strengthen Kurdish political leverage. And instability, however, also brings risks of conflict and external pressure. In a post-Sykes–Picot environment, Kurdistan could either emerge as a key regional actor—or face renewed challenges from competing powers.

Concluding remarks: Between Disorder and Opportunity

The Middle East is not yet entering a new order—rather, it is passing through a period of profound disorder. The Sykes–Picot system is not officially dead, but its foundations are eroding. What replaces it is still unclear. This uncertainty creates both danger and opportunity. The real question is no longer whether the old order is fading—but: Who will shape what comes next? Who benefits and who loses? Those are strategic questions of these times. 

Keywords

#MiddleEastGeopolitics, #SykesPicotAgreement, #NewMiddleEastOrder, #KurdistanFuture, #IraqSyriaFragmentation, #RegionalPowers #MiddleEast, #KurdishGeopolitics, #PostSykesPicotEra, #MiddleEastBordersFuture