Iraq's next prime minister will inherit more than a government. He will inherit a broken relationship between the state and its citizens.
Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj, Sulaimani, Iraq, April 28, 2026 --Ali al-Zubaidi may soon become Iraq's next prime minister. If he does, he will inherit a state facing not one crisis, but several at once. Economic vulnerability. Political fragmentation. Militia influence. Institutional decay. Regional competition. Fiscal dependency. Youth unemployment. Yet beneath all of these lies a deeper and more dangerous problem: legitimacy.
For years, Iraq's political class has struggled not merely to govern, but to persuade citizens that government serves them at all. The gap between state and society has widened steadily, accelerated by corruption, poor services, and, most consequentially, impunity. That is why the warning issued by the Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights deserves close attention.
The organization argued that Zubaidi's nomination comes at one of the most sensitive moments in Iraq's modern history—a moment defined by overlapping crises and a profound collapse of public trust. It is a diagnosis that extends well beyond human rights advocacy. It is a geopolitical reality.
The Crisis Beneath the Crisis
States can survive economic hardship. They can endure political deadlock. They can even weather external pressure. What they struggle to survive is a sustained crisis of legitimacy. Legitimacy is the invisible infrastructure of governance. Without it, institutions weaken, public compliance declines, and coercion gradually substitutes for consent.
Iraq has been moving in that direction for years. The Tishreen protests of 2019 exposed the depth of popular frustration. Demonstrators were not merely protesting unemployment or electricity shortages. They were challenging the entire architecture of post-2003 governance. Their demands were simple but revolutionary:
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Accountability.
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Sovereignty.
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Meritocracy.
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Justice.
The state's response was devastating. Hundreds were killed. Thousands were injured. Many disappeared. Years later, accountability remains elusive. That unresolved trauma continues to shape Iraqi politics today.
Ali al-Zubaidi's Real First Test
Forming a cabinet will attract headlines. Passing a budget will dominate political negotiations. Managing relations with Tehran, Washington, and Erbil will consume diplomatic bandwidth. But Zubaidi's most important challenge may be domestic and moral.
Can he begin to restore trust? The answer will depend less on his rhetoric than on his willingness to confront Iraq's entrenched culture of impunity. The Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights identified three immediate tests:
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Prosecuting those responsible for killing protesters.
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Resolving cases of enforced disappearances.
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Ending systematic impunity for politically connected actors.
These are not simply legal matters. They are foundational acts of state reconstruction.
Why Human Rights Are Strategic
In Iraq, human rights are often treated as a secondary issue—important, but subordinate to security, economics, or coalition politics. That hierarchy is mistaken. Human rights are not separate from state stability. They are central to it. A government that cannot protect peaceful dissent eventually loses the consent of its most politically engaged citizens. A justice system that cannot investigate politically sensitive crimes ceases to function as an independent institution.
Impunity does not merely protect perpetrators. It delegitimizes the state itself.
The Tishreen Legacy
No Iraqi leader can escape the shadow of Tishreen. The movement fundamentally altered Iraq's political landscape. It exposed the fragility of elite consensus. It empowered independent candidates. It shattered the illusion that post-2003 legitimacy could be indefinitely maintained through patronage alone. Most importantly, it created a generation unwilling to accept old bargains. That generation is watching Zubaidi closely. For them, justice is not symbolic. It is existential.
Political Constraints
The challenge, of course, is that accountability in Iraq is never merely judicial. It is political. Investigating protest killings could implicate powerful militia-linked actors, security officials, and political factions whose support may be essential to Zubaidi's governing coalition. This is Iraq's central paradox: The same networks that help form governments often obstruct reform. That is why so many previous prime ministers promised accountability and delivered little. Zubaidi will face the same pressures. Beyond Symbolism Public trust will not be restored through speeches.
It will require visible institutional action. That means:
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Empowering independent investigators.
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Publishing credible findings.
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Protecting witnesses.
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Monitoring detention facilities.
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Expanding press freedoms.
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Preventing future abuses.
Each measure would signal that Iraq's state serves citizens rather than factions. Each would also generate resistance. Reform always does.
Regional and International Implications
Human rights in Iraq are not merely a domestic concern. They shape Iraq's international relationships. Western governments increasingly tie political support, financial cooperation, and security partnerships to governance standards. International investors assess legal predictability alongside economic opportunity. A government associated with renewed repression would face growing external skepticism.
Conversely, even modest accountability measures could significantly strengthen Iraq's international standing. In geopolitics, legitimacy is a strategic asset.
The Danger of Hollow Reform
Iraq's public has heard promises before. Anti-corruption campaigns. Judicial reforms. Accountability initiatives. Most produced headlines rather than structural change. Zubaidi cannot afford another symbolic cycle. A failed reform effort would deepen cynicism, further alienate young Iraqis, and reinforce the belief that elections merely rotate elites without altering outcomes. That would be dangerous.
The Choice Before Zubaidi
He can govern as a coalition manager, prioritizing elite stability over public confidence. Or he can attempt the more difficult task of governing as a state-builder. The two are not always compatible. Short-term political survival often discourages long-term institutional reform. Yet Iraq increasingly requires the latter. A state cannot indefinitely rely on coercion, patronage, and elite bargaining alone. Eventually, legitimacy must be renewed. The Strategic Opportunity. Crises create constraints. They also create openings.
Zubaidi's outsider image and technocratic reputation could provide limited room for maneuver. Public expectations remain low. That can be politically useful. Small but genuine reforms could produce outsized credibility. Justice in even a handful of high-profile cases would resonate nationally. Transparency in detention oversight would attract international praise. Protecting peaceful dissent would immediately distinguish his government from predecessors.
Final Assessment
Ali al-Zubaidi's premiership, if it materializes, will be judged on many fronts. Economic management. Security stabilization. Federal-regional relations. Foreign policy balancing. But history may remember a simpler question: Did he help Iraq reconcile with its own citizens? The Iraqi state does not merely need efficiency. It needs legitimacy. It does not merely need stability. It needs trust. And trust, once broken, can only be rebuilt through justice.
That is the true test awaiting Ali al-Zubaidi. Everything else is secondary.
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