With Article 140 stalled, Peshmerga funding blocked, and oil disputes unresolved, Iraq’s Kurdish leadership faces a strategic pivot: abandon symbolic posts for real leverage in parliament.
Kurdish Policy Analysis / SULAYMANIYAH, Iraq— Iraq’s Kurdish political leadership is facing a growing strategic dilemma: whether to continue holding the largely symbolic presidency or pivot toward positions that offer real leverage over the country’s political and legislative system.
For years, the presidency has been viewed as a cornerstone of Kurdish participation in post-2003 Iraq—a symbol of recognition and federal partnership. But two decades on, that position has delivered little in terms of enforcing constitutional guarantees or resolving core disputes with Baghdad.
Under Article 67 of Iraq’s constitution, the president is tasked with safeguarding the constitution. In practice, however, repeated violations and political deadlock between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region have exposed the limits of that role.
Disputes over territory, oil, security, and budget transfers remain unresolved—despite successive Kurdish presidents holding office.
At the center of Kurdish grievances lies Article 140, the constitutional mechanism designed to resolve the status of disputed territories such as Kirkuk. The article has never been implemented, and Iraqi political leaders have openly declared it obsolete.
Despite holding the presidency during multiple governments, Kurdish leaders have been unable to generate sufficient political pressure to enforce it.
The situation deteriorated further after October 16, 2017, when Iraqi federal forces retook Kirkuk, reshaping the balance of power on the ground and intensifying Kurdish concerns over territorial “rollback.”
Security remains another flashpoint.
The Peshmerga—constitutionally recognized as part of Iraq’s defense system—has faced chronic underfunding, limited federal support, and restrictions on international military assistance. During the war against ISIS, Kurdish forces often operated with minimal backing from Baghdad, reinforcing perceptions of structural neglect.
Energy policy has further deepened the divide.
Efforts to pass a national oil and gas law have repeatedly failed since 2007, leaving a legal vacuum that both sides have exploited. For the Kurdistan Region, this ambiguity has translated into economic pressure, including the suspension of budget transfers and disputes over independent oil exports.
Salary payments and fiscal transfers have become tools of political leverage, with Baghdad periodically halting payments to the Kurdistan Region—triggering economic instability and public discontent.
Beyond formal disputes, Kurdish officials point to broader security concerns, including drone attacks targeting economic infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region. Baghdad’s inability—or unwillingness—to prevent such incidents has raised further doubts about the effectiveness of federal authority.
Against this backdrop, internal Kurdish competition over the presidency—primarily between the KDP and PUK—is increasingly viewed as disconnected from strategic realities.
Politicians are now questioning whether the presidency has become a “courtesy post” that offers symbolic visibility but little practical influence.
Instead, attention is shifting toward the Iraqi parliament—where legislative authority, budget control, and government formation dynamics offer more direct leverage over national policy.
Securing the speakership, or at minimum negotiating binding political agreements during government formation, could provide the Kurdish leadership with stronger tools to protect constitutional rights and economic interests.
Such a shift would mark a significant recalibration of Kurdish strategy in Baghdad: moving away from symbolic representation toward institutional power.
For many in Erbil, the conclusion is becoming harder to ignore—without enforceable guarantees, titles alone cannot secure political rights.
And in a system defined by bargaining power, leverage—not symbolism—may ultimately determine the future of Kurdish autonomy within Iraq.
As constitutional deadlock deepens between Erbil and Baghdad, symbolic leadership roles have failed to protect Kurdish rights—raising urgent questions about power, leverage, and political strategy. Why the Iraqi presidency has failed to secure Kurdish constitutional rights—and why control of parliament may offer stronger leverage in Baghdad–Erbil power struggles.
Why Iraqi Parliament is more important for Kurds than the Presidency?
The reader may be shocked to see this title and ask: How can we demand the return of a post that was established after the fall of Ba'ath as a "Kurdish share" and a symbol of the second nation in Iraq? Especially since our history with the Arab presidents has only painted pictures of repression, Anfal and massacre in our memory, but please stop and look closely at this bitter reality to see why I say that.
In post-2003 Iraq, the president is the guardian of the constitution under Article 67 of the constitution, “striving to comply with the constitution”. Most of the problems between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad stem from non-compliance with the constitution. The powerful party in Baghdad has not only failed to implement the constitution, but has often openly opposed the texts. It may be said that Baghdad is making the same accusation against Erbil, but of course the first strong party is responsible; Because it is the Iraqi authorities that hold the keys to implementation, and when they do not, they force the other side to react. What impact have the four Kurdish presidents in Baghdad had on the protection of Kurdish constitutional rights?
President Barzani in the sixth volume of his book Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement and the late visionary Kurdish leader Nusrewan Mustafa in his book My Memories after 1991 describe in detail what happened in Baghdad during the constitution drafting meetings However, the circumstances of the time, when they had just come to power, the Sunni insurgency and resistance, the unity and solidarity of the Kurdish forces forced them to accept some of these rights.
Article 140 is ignored
The most important constitutional article that the Kurdistan Region considers its right and demands its implementation is Article 140 of the Iraqi permanent constitution, which is a crucial issue for the Kurds The article was not implemented, but Iraqi politicians openly said, "This article is dead. Name a Kurdish president who has billed or exerted real political pressure to implement this article. Even Nuri al-Maliki, who was himself prime minister, has directly and indirectly indicated that the Kurdish president has not taken any steps to implement Article
Not only was this article not implemented, but the process of “degradation” in Kirkuk and other areas, during the rule of Kurdish presidents, especially after October 16, 2017, took on a more dangerous dimension than before
Peshmarga underfunded
Another issue that has not been given its constitutional rights and has become a pending issue between Erbil and Baghdad is the issue of the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga was not created by Baghdad's decision, but is the product of the blood and sacrifices of a people against Baghdad's oppression of the Kurds throughout the history of decades. It is recognized in the constitution as part of the Iraqi defense system, but in reality the Iraqi governments have not provided it with budgets, salaries, weapons or alliances. In the fight against the most brutal terrorist organization (ISIS), the Peshmerga defended without a single magazine of ammunition in Baghdad; Not only that, Baghdad prevented the coalition from providing heavy weapons to the Peshmerga when it needed their approval. Kurdish presidents, most of whom were once Peshmergas themselves, have not taken any practical steps for this force.
Oil and Budget dispute unresolved
Another major issue between Erbil and Baghdad is the issue of oil and gas. Throughout the rule of Iraq, oil has fueled Iraqi wars against the Kurds and neighboring countries The main feature of the constitution is that these articles and clauses require the enactment of special laws to regulate, clarify and elaborate them. In 2007, an oil and gas bill consisting of 43 articles was prepared, but was not approved in parliament and put on the shelf. In 2011, another bill was drafted in the Iraqi parliament consisting of 49 articles, but was not discussed. This legal vacuum has become a weapon to starve the Kurdish people. Over the years, the presidents have not even considered this issue as a proposal, and the problems between Erbil and Baghdad on this issue have increased and continue to this day.
Another issue between the two capitals is the issue of budget and salaries, which is the product of this post-2003 Iraqi rule and has had a major impact on people's lives, markets and economy. Then came ISIS and the Kurdistan Region became a refuge for hundreds of thousands of refugees, but Baghdad refused to move a hair from its hostile stance. Salary was taken as a political hostage and has not been released yet. It may never have occurred to anyone that a country's government would cut the salaries of its employees because of political positions. What did the presidents do in all these financial crises?
The past actions against the Kurdistan economy have been carried out officially and informally under different names in order to stop the Kurdistan Region from developing and turn it backwards. The economic infrastructure of the Kurdistan Region has been bombed by drones from within Iraq for several years. The Iraqi government either cannot stop these groups, or it does not like it. On the other hand, what more has been done to the president, who is the symbol of the country's sovereignty according to the constitution, than a shameful statement?
Given all these unresolved issues and the pointless and annoying struggle the PUK and KDP are waging over this post, I think it is time for the Kurds to give up this courtesy title and give it back to the Arabs. It is better for the Kurds to receive a “written and guaranteed agreement” for their constitutional rights when forming a government, instead of fighting for posts. For balance, I think the Kurds should take the post of speaker of parliament (although I am not optimistic about that), but at least let us no longer be a so-called “constitutional guardian”, which is only used to weaken and not strengthen Kurdistan and Iraqi as well. Because a stronger Kurdistan is needed for a more stronger and unified Iraq.
#Iraq #Kurdistan #Erbil #Baghdad #MiddleEast #Geopolitics #KurdishPolitics #IraqiParliament #Article140 #Peshmerga #EnergyPolitics #PolicyAnalysis
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