Drone strikes, regional spillover, and Baghdad’s limited response expose growing concerns over militia power and the future of U.S.–Iraq relations. Iraq Is at Another Crossroads with Iran-Backed Militias—and Washington
Kurdish Policy Analysis / ERBIL —Iraq is once again facing a turning moment as escalating attacks by Iran-backed militias test the authority of the state and complicate relations with the United States.
Since mid-March, factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces—including Kataib Hezbollah—have intensified drone and missile operations targeting Iraqi Kurdistan, U.S. facilities, and regional infrastructure. A March 28 drone strike on the residence of Nechirvan Barzani in Duhok underscored the widening scope of the conflict.
The attacks are part of a broader escalation tied to regional tensions involving Iran, with militias launching strikes not only inside Iraq but also toward neighboring states and U.S. interests across the region.
A Familiar Pattern, Intensified
Originally formed in 2014 to combat the Islamic State, the PMF has since evolved into a powerful network of more than 200,000 fighters, with deep political and financial integration into the Iraqi state.
Groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba remain central actors, maintaining both armed capabilities and political influence within governing coalitions.
Despite repeated U.S. pressure, Baghdad has not moved decisively to curtail these factions. Officials have instead acknowledged the limits of state control, raising concerns about the balance of power between the government and armed groups.
Kurdistan Under Fire
The Kurdistan Region has borne a significant share of the violence, with hundreds of drone and missile attacks targeting civilian areas, energy infrastructure, and Peshmerga positions.
Strategic sites near Erbil—including energy facilities like the Khor Mor gas field—have been repeatedly hit, disrupting production and contributing to power shortages.
These attacks highlight Kurdistan’s vulnerability as both a partner to the United States and a frontline region in broader regional tensions.
Washington’s Response—and Its Limits
The United States has responded with sustained airstrikes against militia targets, aiming to degrade operational capabilities and deter further escalation.
However, the longer-term challenge is political. Washington now faces a critical question: how to engage a government that formally integrates armed groups it simultaneously seeks to counter.
What Comes Next
Analysts warn that Iraq risks drifting toward a Lebanon-style model, where state institutions coexist with—and are often overshadowed by—powerful non-state armed actors.
Policy options under discussion include:
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Increasing sanctions on militia-linked networks
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Conditioning or reducing security assistance
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Coordinating with Gulf states to limit financial flows
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Pressuring Baghdad to restructure or isolate key PMF factions
The stakes are high. Oil disruptions, declining investor confidence, and continued instability could deepen Iraq’s economic and political fragility.
Last year, the Trump administration repeatedly pressed Baghdad to disarm Iran-backed militias, and this consistent focus helped normalize discussion of disarmament among Iraqi citizens and officials alike. Yet Sudani’s government did not budge. Ironically, Baghdad has long deferred action against these groups in part because it worries about sparking wider violence, yet the result has been growing militia violence against any Iraqis who oppose their agenda. Increasingly, Iraq resembles Lebanon; if Baghdad does not act soon, Iraq, too, will become a failed state.
While the latest demonstration of Tehran’s dominance over Iraq—and Baghdad’s complicity—might tempt the Trump administration to finally quit the country altogether, that would be ill advised. Instead, Washington should push even harder for Iraqi officials to move against these militias, while also seeking other avenues of pressure in the likely event that Baghdad keeps deferring the issue:
Target Baghdad’s direct funding for militias. By this point, the PMF is too large and too influential to fully disband, so the U.S. goal should be for Baghdad to excise the most problematic groups. The Trump administration can facilitate this effort by sanctioning all Iraqi government officials who approve or enable the funding of U.S.-designated terrorist organizations like Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, KH, and others.
End indirect funding for militias. In October, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Muhandis General Company, a major Iraqi commercial entity controlled by the PMF. Yet the Iraqi government is widely believed to still be subcontracting projects to this conglomerate’s alias groups, thereby channeling substantial funding to the PMF. If Baghdad is flaunting U.S. sanctions or just not performing due diligence, Washington should hold it accountable.
Reassess security assistance. The United States provides Iraq with significant security assistance, including more than $200 million in counterterrorism aid for 2026. Yet instead of using these funds to constrain Iran-backed terrorist organizations, Baghdad has given them exponentially more than this amount from Iraq’s own coffers and required national army units to share bases with them. The government has done much to fight Sunni terrorist groups like IS, but it must now step up against Shia terrorist groups as well—otherwise, U.S. security assistance should be curtailed or ended entirely.
Seek Arab assistance. Although Baghdad has sought better relations with Arab countries in recent years, PMF units have targeted at least three of them during this war, in some cases launching attacks from lands granted to certain militias by the government. Accordingly, Washington should press Arab states, particularly in the Gulf region, to withhold aid and foreign direct investment from Iraq until the government ends its support for these groups.
#Iraq #Iran #PMF #Geopolitics #MiddleEast #USForeignPolicy #Kurdistan #Security #Militias #Conflict
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