Why is reintegrating of the Popular Mobilization Forces "PMF" in the Iraqi Security Forces impractical?
Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj
Seeking to merge Popular Mobilization Forces with the Iraqi Security Forces is not applicable for several reasons, notably that the factions of the PMF are not homogeneous, and even if they are merged, who will take the military salutation to the other party?
In February 2016, former Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, the then most popular man among the Iraqis, ran the government and the army that won victories over Daesh "ISIS". He tried to strengthen his image as a statesman and decided to merge the "PMF" with the Iraqi Security Forces, but he received a harsh slap with a strong rejection from the factions of PMF and paid a heavy price when he lost his post as premiership of government.
The current prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi is aware of the tragedy of his predecessor, Abadi. Since taking office, Abdul Mahdi has been trying to avoid the mistakes of Abadi, who is accused of standing by the United States at the expense of Iran. Abdul Mahdi deliberately chooses his words and statements for fear of falling into the trap of bias either toward U.S or Iran affiliated forces. But Adel Abdul Mahdi's recent decision to organize PMF put him in a bind.
Abdul Mahdi issued a new resolution last week that seeks to subdue PMF to forces of the government. The decision is not new. Former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has already issued a clearer decision to subjugate PMF to state power and failed.
The new resolution calls for the closure of all the headquarters of PMF inside and outside the cities, and PMF to give up their religious names associated with personalities and places of religious history linked mostly to the Shiite doctrine, and holds its units and military units to known numbers as with the army. PMF must work according to its own law passed by the parliament in 2015 and have a president chosen by the prime minister as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Most of the factions, including Muqtada al-Sadr, who has a faction of his own called Saraya Al-Salam or "the Peace Brigades", welcomed this new decision except for those known as "Resistance Factions" closely affiliated to Iran, such as the Hezbollah Brigades, the Nujabaa "The Noble Mens' Brigades" and the Martyrs Brigades, who have been reluctant to integrate the PMF into the army, it is no coincidence that these factions are the same ones that stood up to the decision of former Prime Minister Haider Abadi.
But the problem of reintegrating PMF is much greater than it seems. Discussions are merely focused on integrating these forces with the Iraqi Security Forces, but the real problem that everyone overlooks is that the factions that make up PMF are not homogeneous at all in the original, and the circumstances of the formation of PMF created conditions that are difficult to integrate them with anything else.
Abdul-Mahdi's decision does not seem new at all, and some close associates of the government attribute it to just a show by the government, which is struggling to maintain its neutrality between the United States and Iran. This movement came after it was found that the bombing of oil installations inside Saudi Arabia did not start from Yemen, it was announced, and even drone aircraft were launched from Iraq, and the Americans informed the government explicitly, and the government had to take any step to prove itself.
In February 2016, former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered the appointment of General Mohsen al-Kaabi (Former Commander of the Federal Police) as the head of PMF, replacing Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes in an attempt by the government to control PMF. But the factions close to Iran strongly rejected the decision. At the time, the Hezbollah Brigades said that "the Popular Mobilization Forces are jihadist ideological factions that have administrative and organizational contexts that differ from the classical contexts used in the military establishment. Their leadership requires experience in non-conventional wars characterized by rapid movement and maneuver and the immediate change of plans as required by the field situation. This fact is not without some validation.
In response to a question about how he sees a supposed scenario of integrating fighters from PMF with members of his military unit, a senior Army Officer of Iraq told Al-Menasa that "Despite my long experience, I do not have a clear plan," . He also says "The army officers are training for three years in the Army Academy, I do not know how the situation will be when the elements of PMF are with the military, will they greet and Salute for the senior officers of the rank, and PMF fighters are popular and respectful even among the army, how can the orders be directed, and who launches it? "
When the Shiite Marja "cleric" Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa to fight "Daesh" thousands of Iraqis joined the armed factions later known as the "Popular Mobilization Forces" and won the recognition of the Iraqi parliament, and these fighters did not meet the standards of age and skill and some of them can not even read and write, the risk was greater than concern about it when ISIS approached the suburbs of Baghdad, and talk about integration with elements of the army, which is subject to strict military standards is not without obstacles.
But the deeper issue in the problem lies in the factions themselves. They are not as homogeneous as one might imagine. There are deep disagreements among some of these factions. Their goals and ambitions are different. Their loyalty, administrative organization, ideological affiliation, religious and political reference, and funding and armament are not the same.
The factions are classified into three main sections, the factions close to Iran and take orders from the Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a reference and religious leader, including the Hezbollah Brigades, Nujabaa and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Factions of the Shiite political parties, most prominent of them Saraya Al-Salam "Peace Brigades" affiliated to Muqtada al-Sadr, and factions affiliated with the Shiite cleric Ali al-Sistani.
The pro-Iranian factions within PMF seek to keep the "Popular Mobilization Forces independent of the state and adopt political goals towards changing the political dynamics based on the parliamentary system and the transition to a presidential system. They also have strong political positions on the Kurdistan region and support the popular demonstrations that take place every summer. It is believed that they are backed by some international parties.
On the other hand, the factions affiliated with al-Sistani and al-Sadr support integration of PMF with the Iraqi security forces and have no major political goals in changing the existing political system and stand side by side with popular demonstrations that demand more and better public services.
With these great differences existing, the integration of PMF with ISF seems impossible. How can an element in an armed faction such as the "Peace Brigades" affiliated to Muqtada Al-Sadr be able to implement the dictates of its supreme leader, for example, from the faction of "Asaib Ahl al-Haq"? It is known that both factions are in dispute and have reached the level of armed clashes in the past.
The local and international calls for the integration of Popular Mobilization Forces with the Iraqi Security Forces are illogical, and will not be achieved in the short and medium term, since the conditions of its establishment and its differences and objectives prevent the implementation of this, and one of the most important decisions taken by the government to ensure the loyalty of the PMF and subject to the laws was a decision to exchange their salaries from the government in the fiscal budget of 2019, and that the continuation of the government in the coming years will make it stronger and influence on PMF, making it easier to search for scenarios to determine the fate of these forces.
In February 2016, former Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, the then most popular man among the Iraqis, ran the government and the army that won victories over Daesh "ISIS". He tried to strengthen his image as a statesman and decided to merge the "PMF" with the Iraqi Security Forces, but he received a harsh slap with a strong rejection from the factions of PMF and paid a heavy price when he lost his post as premiership of government.
The current prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi is aware of the tragedy of his predecessor, Abadi. Since taking office, Abdul Mahdi has been trying to avoid the mistakes of Abadi, who is accused of standing by the United States at the expense of Iran. Abdul Mahdi deliberately chooses his words and statements for fear of falling into the trap of bias either toward U.S or Iran affiliated forces. But Adel Abdul Mahdi's recent decision to organize PMF put him in a bind.
Abdul Mahdi issued a new resolution last week that seeks to subdue PMF to forces of the government. The decision is not new. Former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has already issued a clearer decision to subjugate PMF to state power and failed.
The new resolution calls for the closure of all the headquarters of PMF inside and outside the cities, and PMF to give up their religious names associated with personalities and places of religious history linked mostly to the Shiite doctrine, and holds its units and military units to known numbers as with the army. PMF must work according to its own law passed by the parliament in 2015 and have a president chosen by the prime minister as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Most of the factions, including Muqtada al-Sadr, who has a faction of his own called Saraya Al-Salam or "the Peace Brigades", welcomed this new decision except for those known as "Resistance Factions" closely affiliated to Iran, such as the Hezbollah Brigades, the Nujabaa "The Noble Mens' Brigades" and the Martyrs Brigades, who have been reluctant to integrate the PMF into the army, it is no coincidence that these factions are the same ones that stood up to the decision of former Prime Minister Haider Abadi.
But the problem of reintegrating PMF is much greater than it seems. Discussions are merely focused on integrating these forces with the Iraqi Security Forces, but the real problem that everyone overlooks is that the factions that make up PMF are not homogeneous at all in the original, and the circumstances of the formation of PMF created conditions that are difficult to integrate them with anything else.
Abdul-Mahdi's decision does not seem new at all, and some close associates of the government attribute it to just a show by the government, which is struggling to maintain its neutrality between the United States and Iran. This movement came after it was found that the bombing of oil installations inside Saudi Arabia did not start from Yemen, it was announced, and even drone aircraft were launched from Iraq, and the Americans informed the government explicitly, and the government had to take any step to prove itself.
In February 2016, former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered the appointment of General Mohsen al-Kaabi (Former Commander of the Federal Police) as the head of PMF, replacing Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes in an attempt by the government to control PMF. But the factions close to Iran strongly rejected the decision. At the time, the Hezbollah Brigades said that "the Popular Mobilization Forces are jihadist ideological factions that have administrative and organizational contexts that differ from the classical contexts used in the military establishment. Their leadership requires experience in non-conventional wars characterized by rapid movement and maneuver and the immediate change of plans as required by the field situation. This fact is not without some validation.
In response to a question about how he sees a supposed scenario of integrating fighters from PMF with members of his military unit, a senior Army Officer of Iraq told Al-Menasa that "Despite my long experience, I do not have a clear plan," . He also says "The army officers are training for three years in the Army Academy, I do not know how the situation will be when the elements of PMF are with the military, will they greet and Salute for the senior officers of the rank, and PMF fighters are popular and respectful even among the army, how can the orders be directed, and who launches it? "
When the Shiite Marja "cleric" Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa to fight "Daesh" thousands of Iraqis joined the armed factions later known as the "Popular Mobilization Forces" and won the recognition of the Iraqi parliament, and these fighters did not meet the standards of age and skill and some of them can not even read and write, the risk was greater than concern about it when ISIS approached the suburbs of Baghdad, and talk about integration with elements of the army, which is subject to strict military standards is not without obstacles.
But the deeper issue in the problem lies in the factions themselves. They are not as homogeneous as one might imagine. There are deep disagreements among some of these factions. Their goals and ambitions are different. Their loyalty, administrative organization, ideological affiliation, religious and political reference, and funding and armament are not the same.
The factions are classified into three main sections, the factions close to Iran and take orders from the Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a reference and religious leader, including the Hezbollah Brigades, Nujabaa and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Factions of the Shiite political parties, most prominent of them Saraya Al-Salam "Peace Brigades" affiliated to Muqtada al-Sadr, and factions affiliated with the Shiite cleric Ali al-Sistani.
The pro-Iranian factions within PMF seek to keep the "Popular Mobilization Forces independent of the state and adopt political goals towards changing the political dynamics based on the parliamentary system and the transition to a presidential system. They also have strong political positions on the Kurdistan region and support the popular demonstrations that take place every summer. It is believed that they are backed by some international parties.
On the other hand, the factions affiliated with al-Sistani and al-Sadr support integration of PMF with the Iraqi security forces and have no major political goals in changing the existing political system and stand side by side with popular demonstrations that demand more and better public services.
With these great differences existing, the integration of PMF with ISF seems impossible. How can an element in an armed faction such as the "Peace Brigades" affiliated to Muqtada Al-Sadr be able to implement the dictates of its supreme leader, for example, from the faction of "Asaib Ahl al-Haq"? It is known that both factions are in dispute and have reached the level of armed clashes in the past.
The local and international calls for the integration of Popular Mobilization Forces with the Iraqi Security Forces are illogical, and will not be achieved in the short and medium term, since the conditions of its establishment and its differences and objectives prevent the implementation of this, and one of the most important decisions taken by the government to ensure the loyalty of the PMF and subject to the laws was a decision to exchange their salaries from the government in the fiscal budget of 2019, and that the continuation of the government in the coming years will make it stronger and influence on PMF, making it easier to search for scenarios to determine the fate of these forces.
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